Mobile telephone numbering in India

Many times I recieve missed calls and really wonder atlist which region this call is from. Just out of curiosity searched the net and found out the following link on google.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/India_Cellphone_Numbering

This highlights all the prefixes used by Indian Cell phone providers in various regions.

Learning knowledge management from Ramayan and Mahabharat

Epics of India, Ramayan and Mahabharata, war ends not with celebration of victory but with transmission of knowledge . In the Ramayan, Ravan lies mortally wounded on the battlefield and the monkeys are celebrating their victory, when Ram turns to his brother , Lakshman, and says, “While Ravan was a brute, he was also a great scholar. Go to him quickly and request him to share whatever knowledge he can.”
The obedient Lakshman rushes to Ravan’s side and whispers in his ears, “Demonking , all your life you have taken not given. Now the noble Ram gives you an opportunity to mend your ways. Share your vast wisdom. Do not let it die with you. For that you will be surely be blessed.”
Ravan responds by simply turning away. An angry Lakshman goes back to Ram and says: “He is as arrogant as he always was, too proud to share anything.” Ram looks at his brother and asks him softly, “Where did you stand while asking him for knowledge?” “Next to his head so that I hear what he had to say clearly.” Ram smiles, places his bow on the ground and walks to where Ravan lies. Lakshman watches in astonishment as his brother kneels at Ravan’s feet. With palms joined, with extreme humility, Ram says, “Lord of Lanka, you abducted my wife, a terrible crime for which I have been forced to punish you. Now, you are no more my enemy. I see you now as you are known across the world, as the wise son of Rishi Vishrava. I bow to you and request you to share your wisdom with me. Please do that for if you die without doing so, all your wisdom will be lost forever to the world.” To Lakshman’s surprise, Ravan opens his eyes and raises his arms to salute Ram, “If only I had more time as your teacher than as your enemy. Standing at my feet as a student should, unlike your rude younger brother, you are a worthy recipient of my knowledge. I have very little time so I cannot share much but let me tell you one important lesson I have learnt in my life. Things that are bad for you seduce you easily; you run towards them impatiently. But things which are actually good for always fail to attract you; you shun them creatively, finding powerful excuses to justify your procrastination . That is why I was impatient to abduct Sita but avoided meeting you. This is the wisdom of my life, Ram. My last words. I give it to you.” With these words, Ravan dies.

There’s similar knowledge transmission after the Mahabharat war is over and the Kauravas are all dead. As the victorious Pandavas are about to assume control of Hastinapur, Krishna advises them to talk to Bhisma, their grand uncle, who lies mortally wounded on the battlefield. As a result of a blessing, death would elude him for some time. “Make him talk until his last breath. Ask him questions. He has a lot to tell,” says Krishna. Sure enough, when prompted , the dying Bhisma spends hours discussing various topics: history, geography, politics, economics , management, war, ethics, morality, sex, astronomy , metaphysics and spirituality . Bhisma’s discourse is captured in the Shanti Parva (discussions of peace) and Anushasan Parva (discussions on discipline) that makes up a quarter of the Mahabharata. After listening to their grandsire, the Pandavas have a better understanding of the world, and this makes them better kings.

Long has this knowledge drain been recognised. Over the past decade, a whole new business process known as knowledge management has evolved that seeks to harness, store, transmit this knowledge . Every CEO agrees that it is a valuable business process, that investment in it is critical. Policies have been made, people have been hired and systems have been deployed.
Unfortunately, for all the initial enthusiasm, implementation has been lacking. Unlike retrieving cash, retrieving knowledge from employees, both current and future, is not easy. Often because they are like Sahadeva. Sahadeva was the youngest Pandava and, in the South Indian Mahabharata, he is described as an expert in many predictive sciences such as astrology , palmistry and face reading. But he is cursed: if he ever gave any information voluntarily , his head will split into a thousand pieces. That is why he is silent throughout the epic.
He knows every fortune and misfortune that his family will go through, but he can never use his knowledge to forewarn anyone. When Yudhishtira finally learns of his brother’s prowess he is furious. “Why did you not tell me all that you knew?” All he gets in response is Sahadeva’s silence. Most employees in an organisation are Sahadevas. Sahadevas are of two types: either they are unwilling to share their knowledge or they don’t have the means to do so. The former category knows that knowledge is power and will not give it away under any
circumstances. The latter category is willing to share knowledge but either no one asks them for it or there is no system where they can make it available for others.

Knowledge Management is leadership driven. Only a Ram, not a Laskhman can do it. He must first believe in it. He must respect the fact that everyone in his organisation, even those who he does not particularly like, are repositories of great wisdom – not only knowledge of things that work but also knowledge of things that do not work. He must make conscious efforts to capture as much of it as possible. The simplest method is talking to people, while they are on the job and especially when they are leaving the organisation . An exit interviews must never be a ritual. Neither must it be an exercise to just get the venom out nor an exercise to expose the underbelly that has prompted the resignation. It must be a concerted effort to gather what was the knowledge acquired between joining and leaving the organisation. Interviews work if the organisation is mall. As the organisation grows in size one needs a more formal system, at
the very least a simple archival system managed by a clerk or secretary but on a larger scale, a sophisticated knowledge repository , a kind of electronic cupboard where at least the final version of presentations, documents and spreadsheets of key business events can be stored.
This sounds very logical but most organisations do not do this. The effort involved is huge and the rewards are neither immediate nor tangible. A brand manager joining a reputed FMCG company, for example, once discovered that they did not have the brand deck (plans, tools, research, messages) of the past five years of a key product . What the organisation did have is the financial numbers – but not a clear history of marketing messages it had put out before the consumer. Previous brand managers had handed over all documents to someone and it was kept somewhere. But no one knew who that someone was and what that somewhere was. In the absence of a simple archiving system, the new brand manager had to collate all brand related background information from scratch so that he could define the future brand positioning. A fully avoidable waste of energy and resources. Every organisation has a very powerful Finance Department that works round the clock to keep an eye on money flowing in and out of the organisation . Internal and external auditors, controllers and accountants keep a hawk’s
eye on every bill and purchase order. But not even a fraction of that energy is used by companies to manage their knowledge. This indicates that most organisations do not believe that Lakshmi follows Saraswati: they do not believe that existence of knowledge systems improve efficiency and effectiveness and can provide raw materials to provoke new ideas or prevent old mistakes. Unless a leader believes that Saraswati is critical , he will end up with an organisation of Sahadevas.
Take a step back. Check if you are creatively shunning this rather tedious matter of knowledge management. If you are, then remember the wise words of Ravan: it must be actually good for you.
Coutesey: Economic Times dated 21st December 2007

Stock Market Crash...

Stock market crash
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A stock market crash is a sudden dramatic decline of stock prices across a significant cross-section of a stock market. Crashes are driven by panic as much as by underlying economic factors. They often follow speculative stock market bubbles.
Stock market crashes are social phenomena where external economic events combine with crowd behaviour and psychology in a positive feedback loop where selling by some market participants drives more market participants to sell. Generally speaking, crashes usually occur under the following conditions: a prolonged period of rising stock prices and excessive economic optimism, a market where P/E ratios exceed long-term averages, and extensive use of margin debt and leverage by market participants.
There is no numerically-specific definition of a crash but the term commonly applies to steep double-digit percentage losses in a stock market index over a period of several days. Crashes are often distinguished from bear markets by panic selling and abrupt, dramatic price declines. Bear markets are periods of declining stock market prices that are measured in months or years. While crashes are often associated with bear markets, they do not necessarily go hand in hand. The crash of 1987 for example did not lead to a bear market. Likewise, the Japanese Nikkei bear market of the 1990s occurred over several years without any notable crashes.

Mathematical theory of stock market crashes

The mathematical characterisation of stock market movements has been a subject of intense interest. The conventional assumption that stock markets behave according to a random Gaussian or normal distribution is incorrect. Large movements in prices (i.e. crashes) are much more common than would be predicted in a normal distribution. Research at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology shows that there is evidence that the frequency of stock market crashes follow an inverse cubic power law.[6] This and other studies suggest that stock market crashes are a sign of self-organized criticality in financial markets. In 1963, Benoît Mandelbrot proposed that instead of following a strict random walk, stock price variations executed a Lévy flight.[7] A Lévy flight is a random walk which is occasionally disrupted by large movements. In 1995, Rosario Mantegna and Gene Stanley analyzed a million records of the S&P 500 market index, calculating the returns over a five year period.[8] Their conclusion was that stock market returns are more volatile than a Gaussian distribution but less volatile than a Lévy flight.
Researchers continue to study this theory, particularly using computer simulation of crowd behaviour, and the applicability of models to reproduce crash-like phenomena....

Nano is here to stay...

Last week Ratan Tata kept his words and delievered his promise। Yes you are right Tata gave the much awaited 'People's car' with the agreed prise and within the agreed timelines. As he rightly said Pachaouri need not have nightmares। Not Sunita narain or the green activists need to worry because of Nano.

I always wonder if these NGOs are really against the development। The whole life they just think about protesting and not progressing। When Sunita Nairain can come in her luxury car why should not others? Why only the small Nano will create trafic problems and why can't be her car or Pachouri's CAR? Surprising।

Okay I agree with the environmentalists who are trying to the noble cause of the 'Global Warming control'। Then they should protest against the Government policies, the policy makers, the law makers and not against the one who is a visionary, who is trying to bring out the revolution. It reminds me of the old stories I read in school book। Way back in 16th century when Gallilio galieli put forward the concept around earth's motion, there was a huge outcry. i don't exactly rememebr. but I more of less think the same here. Not only he, there were so many revolutionary, visionaries who faced the wrath of the society. But still nobdoy could stop them.

I guess Nano is a paradigm shift. No body would have imagined a lower middle class, middle class having a car. It was just assumed as a rich man's area. Now even an autoriksha driver can think of Nano. Who knows tomorrow you and may be using Nano as our cabbi. See below how a Nano can change the society. Little bit of exageration, but worth have a look....

Flash Slideshow

What is Subprime Effect and Impact on Indian Economy

If you are the kind who follows the business press and news channels very closely, then chances are that, in the last one week, you would have heard stock market experts blaming US subprime defaults for the fall in the Indian markets।

Welcome to the world of globalisation, where when America sneezes, India catches cold. But what on earth is this subprime crisis?
It all starts with an entrepreneur who finds a demand supply gap between people who want to buy a house and people who have the money to lend.
These people who want to buy a house do not have a good credit rating, i.e., their probability of defaulting on the loan repayment is very high.
So, if anybody wants to lend money to them, it will have to be at a significantly higher interest rate (sub-prime rates is the jargon for it). This is because the entrepreneur lending the money is taking a higher risk, and hence, needs to be compensated through higher returns.
The entrepreneur takes a loan from a bank/ investment bank at low interest rate (as he has a good credit rating, he can raise money at competitive rates) and lends out that money to many people at a higher interest rate.
This ensures that he gets a higher return than what he pays on the loan. At the same time, by giving out loans to many people, he has ensured that a few defaults on repayments do not have a huge impact.
Another key feature of these loans is refinancing. The loans are such, that in the first 2-3 years, the interest rates are very low and then they become variable (which means they will become volatile and can go up significantly) for the remaining term, usually 27-28 years as the loans are generally for 30 years.
When real-estate markets are booming, refinancing is not a big problem. Every two years, the borrower gets to refinance his loan, thereby his cost of loan never really goes up.
The entrepreneur, on his part, securitises the loan by issuing mortgage-backed securities (MBS) i.e., he divides his loan into marketable financial securities and sells them to investors. The investors are promised a certain rate of interest on these securities.
The money collected by securitising the loans is used by the entrepreneur to repay the bank/ investment bank. The coupon (interest) payments and the repayment of principal for the investors of the MBS are met by the installments, which the home loan borrower pays every month.
As interest rates start climbing, the impact will be felt on the real-estate market with prices flattening/climbing down. A double whammy will hit the home-loan borrowers as rates start climbing. They were not in a position to pay higher installments and when they went to refinance their loans, as they had been doing earlier, it was not possible this time around as nobody wanted to refinance when real-estate prices were falling. This lead to defaults by the borrowers (remember - their credit quality was always very poor).
As the borrowers default, the repayments from the borrowers, which were used to meet the interest obligations of the securitised paper, also stops. This lead the investors to bang the doors of the entrepreneur who had issued the security. What could the entrepreneur do? He would file for bankruptcy.
Now, what happens to the investors?
In case of institutional funds, all their investments would turn. Any fund with global exposure has percentage allocations to various parts of the world. So, in case the US exposure turns bad, the fund will have to pull out of all markets for keeping the percentage allocation in line with the stated objective, and also for meeting possible redemptions.
IKB, a German bank, has already said that it had invested in such papers and has issued a profit warning. In fact, the issue is snowballing into a larger one, with German investors worried about other banks having similar exposure as well. Meanwhile, German banks have come together to bail out the bank even as the IKB chief executive has stepped down.
Now, if this is not all, there starts a negative spiral. As prices flatten, defaults increase as no refinancing is available. As defaults increase, lending rates increase as lending is now done in a stricter manner. As lending slows, the flow of money to the sector stops even more, so prices decline still further and thus starts a cascading effect.
Now, the debate is on whether this crisis will have an impact on the US economy as a whole or will the economy be insulated from this crisis? In case this virus affects the economy, one can forget support levels for our markets…and yes, you never catch a falling knife, so the best step would be to stay away from the markets. Once the storm has subsided, you can find pearls at throwaway prices!

India USA Nuclear Deal - What is Article 123

Please find below the so called article 123 from the India - USA nuclear deal।

GREEMENT FOR COOPERATION BETWEENTHE GOVERNMENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND THEGOVERNMENT OF INDIACONCERNING PEACEFUL USES OF NUCLEAR ENERGY (123 AGREEMENT)
The Government of India and the Government of the United States of America, hereinafter referred to as the Parties,
RECOGNIZING the significance of civilian nuclear energy for meeting growing global energy demands in a cleaner and more efficient manner;
DESIRING to cooperate extensively in the full development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security, on a stable, reliable and predictable basis;
WISHING to develop such cooperation on the basis of mutual respect for sovereignty, non-interference in each other's internal affairs, equality, mutual benefit, reciprocity and with due respect for each other's nuclear programmes;
DESIRING to establish the necessary legal framework and basis for cooperation concerning peaceful uses of nuclear energy;
AFFIRMING that cooperation under this Agreement is between two States possessing advanced nuclear technology, both Parties having the same benefits and advantages, both committed to preventing WMD proliferation;
NOTING the understandings expressed in the India - U.S. Joint Statement of July 18, 2005 to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation with India covering aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycle;
AFFIRMING their support for the objectives of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system, as applicable to India and the United States of America, and its importance in ensuring that international cooperation in development and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes is carried out under arrangements that will not contribute to the proliferation of nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices;
NOTING their respective commitments to safety and security of peaceful uses of nuclear energy, to adequate physical protection of nuclear material and effective national export controls;
MINDFUL that peaceful nuclear activities must be undertaken with a view to protecting the environment;
MINDFUL of their shared commitment to preventing the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and
DESIROUS of strengthening the strategic partnership between them;
Have agreed on the following:
ARTICLE 1 - DEFINITIONS
For the purposes of this Agreement:
(A) "By-product material" means any radioactive material (except special fissionable material) yielded in or made radioactive by exposure to the radiation incident to the process of producing or utilizing special fissionable material. By-product material shall not be subject to safeguards or any other form of verification under this Agreement, unless it has been decided otherwise by prior mutual agreement in writing between the two Parties.
(B) "Component" means a component part of equipment, or other item so designated by agreement of the Parties.
(C) "Conversion" means any of the normal operations in the nuclear fuel cycle, preceding fuel fabrication and excluding enrichment, by which uranium is transformed from one chemical form to another - for example, from uranium hexafluoride (UF6) to uranium dioxide (UO2) or from uranium oxide to metal.
(D) "Decommissioning" means the actions taken at the end of a facility's useful life to retire the facility from service in the manner that provides adequate protection for the health and safety of the decommissioning workers and the general public, and for the environment. These actions can range from closing down the facility and a minimal removal of nuclear material coupled with continuing maintenance and surveillance, to a complete removal of residual radioactivity in excess of levels acceptable for unrestricted use of the facility and its site.
(E) "Dual-Use Item" means a nuclear related item which has a technical use in both nuclear and non-nuclear applications.
(F) "Equipment" means any equipment in nuclear operation including reactor, reactor pressure vessel, reactor fuel charging and discharging equipment, reactor control rods, reactor pressure tubes, reactor primary coolant pumps, zirconium tubing, equipment for fuel fabrication and any other item so designated by the Parties.
(G) "High enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to twenty percent or greater in the isotope 235.
(H) "Information" means any information that is not in the public domain and is transferred in any form pursuant to this Agreement and so designated and documented in hard copy or digital form by mutual agreement by the Parties that it shall be subject to this Agreement, but will cease to be information whenever the Party transferring the information or any third party legitimately releases it into the public domain.
(I) "Low enriched uranium" means uranium enriched to less than twenty percent in the isotope 235.
(J) "Major critical component" means any part or group of parts essential to the operation of a sensitive nuclear facility or heavy water production facility.
(K) "Non-nuclear material" means heavy water, or any other material suitable for use in a reactor to slow down high velocity neutrons and increase the likelihood of further fission, as may be jointly designated by the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
(L) "Nuclear material" means (1) source material and (2) special fissionable material. "Source material" means uranium containing the mixture of isotopes occurring in nature; uranium depleted in the isotope 235; thorium; any of the foregoing in the form of metal, alloy, chemical compound, or concentrate; any other material containing one or more of the foregoing in such concentration as the Board of Governors of the IAEA shall from time to time determine; and such other materials as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" means plutonium, uranium-233, uranium enriched in the isotope 233 or 235, any substance containing one or more of the foregoing, and such other substances as the Board of Governors of the IAEA may determine or as may be agreed by the appropriate authorities of both Parties. "Special fissionable material" does not include "source material". Any determination by the Board of Governors of the IAEA under Article XX of that Agency's Statute or otherwise that amends the list of materials considered to be "source material" or "special fissionable material" shall only have effect under this Agreement when both Parties to this Agreement have informed each other in writing that they accept such amendment.
(M) "Peaceful purposes" include the use of information, nuclear material, equipment or components in such fields as research, power generation, medicine, agriculture and industry, but do not include use in, research on, or development of any nuclear explosive device or any other military purpose. Provision of power for a military base drawn from any power network, production of radioisotopes to be used for medical purposes in military environment for diagnostics, therapy and sterility assurance, and other similar purposes as may be mutually agreed by the Parties shall not be regarded as military purpose.
(N) "Person" means any individual or any entity subject to the territorial jurisdiction of either Party but does not include the Parties.
(O) "Reactor" means any apparatus, other than a nuclear weapon or other nuclear explosive device, in which a self-sustaining fission chain reaction is maintained by utilizing uranium, plutonium, or thorium or any combination thereof.
(P) "Sensitive nuclear facility" means any facility designed or used primarily for uranium enrichment, reprocessing of nuclear fuel, or fabrication of nuclear fuel containing plutonium.
(Q) "Sensitive nuclear technology" means any information that is not in the public domain and that is important to the design, construction, fabrication, operation, or maintenance of any sensitive nuclear facility, or other such information that may be so designated by agreement of the Parties.
ARTICLE 2 - SCOPE OF COOPERATION
1. The Parties shall cooperate in the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes in accordance with the provisions of this Agreement. Each Party shall implement this Agreement in accordance with its respective applicable treaties, national laws, regulations, and license requirements concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.
2. The purpose of the Agreement being to enable full civil nuclear energy cooperation between the Parties, the Parties may pursue cooperation in all relevant areas to include, but not limited to, the following:
a. Advanced nuclear energy research and development in such areas as may be agreed between the Parties;b. Nuclear safety matters of mutual interest and competence, as set out in Article 3;c. Facilitation of exchange of scientists for visits, meetings, symposia and collaborative research;d. Full civil nuclear cooperation activities covering nuclear reactors and aspects of the associated nuclear fuel cycleincluding technology transfer on an industrial or commercial scale between the Parties or authorized persons;e. Development of a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors;f. Advanced research and development in nuclear sciences including but not limited to biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry, environment and climate change;g. Supply between the Parties, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries, of nuclear material;h. Alteration in form or content of nuclear material as provided for in Article 6;i. Supply between the Parties of equipment, whether for use by or for the benefit of the Parties or third countries;j. Controlled thermonuclear fusion including in multilateral projects; andk. Other areas of mutual interest as may be agreed by the Parties.
3. Transfer of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information under this Agreement may be undertaken directly between the Parties or through authorized persons. Such transfers shall be subject to this Agreement and to such additional terms and conditions as may be agreed by the Parties. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components and information transferred from the territory of one Party to the territory of the other Party, whether directly or through a third country, will be regarded as having been transferred pursuant to this Agreement only upon confirmation, by the appropriate authority of the recipient Party to the appropriate authority of the supplier Party that such items both will be subject to the Agreement and have been received by the recipient Party.
4. The Parties affirm that the purpose of this Agreement is to provide for peaceful nuclear cooperation and not to affect the unsafeguarded nuclear activities of either Party. Accordingly, nothing in this Agreement shall be interpreted as affecting the rights of the Parties to use for their own purposes nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology produced, acquired or developed by them independent of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology transferred to them pursuant to this Agreement. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner so as not to hinder or otherwise interfere with any other activities involving the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, information or technology and military nuclear facilities produced, acquired or developed by them independent of this Agreement for their own purposes.
ARTICLE 3 - TRANSFER OF INFORMATION
1. Information concerning the use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes may be transferred between the Parties. Transfers of information may be accomplished through reports, data banks and computer programs and any other means mutually agreed to by the Parties. Fields that may be covered include, but shall not be limited to, the following:
a. Research, development, design, construction, operation, maintenance and use of reactors, reactor experiments, and decommissioning;b. The use of nuclear material in physical, chemical, radiological and biological research, medicine, agriculture and industry;c. Fuel cycle activities to meet future world-wide civil nuclear energy needs, including multilateral approaches to which they are parties for ensuring nuclear fuel supply and appropriate techniques for management of nuclear wastes;d. Advanced research and development in nuclear science and technology;e. Health, safety, and environmental considerations related to the foregoing;f. Assessments of the role nuclear power may play in national energy plans;g. Codes, regulations and standards for the nuclear industry;h. Research on controlled thermonuclear fusion including bilateral activities and contributions toward multilateral projects such as the International Thermonuclear Experimental Reactor (ITER); andi. Any other field mutually agreed to by the Parties.
2. Cooperation pursuant to this Article may include, but is not limited to, training, exchange of personnel, meetings, exchange of samples, materials and instruments for experimental purposes and a balanced participation in joint studies and projects.
3. This Agreement does not require the transfer of any information regarding matters outside the scope of this Agreement, or information that the Parties are not permitted under their respective treaties, national laws, or regulations to transfer.
4. Restricted Data, as defined by each Party, shall not be transferred under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 4 - NUCLEAR TRADE
1. The Parties shall facilitate nuclear trade between themselves in the mutual interests of their respective industry, utilities and consumers and also, where appropriate, trade between third countries and either Party of items obligated to the other Party. The Parties recognize that reliability of supplies is essential to ensure smooth and uninterrupted operation of nuclear facilities and that industry in both the Parties needs continuing reassurance that deliveries can be made on time in order to plan for the efficient operation of nuclear installations.
2. Authorizations, including export and import licenses as well as authorizations or consents to third parties, relating to trade, industrial operations or nuclear material movement should be consistent with the sound and efficient administration of this Agreement and should not be used to restrict trade. It is further agreed that if the relevant authority of the concerned Party considers that an application cannot be processed within a twomonth period it shall immediately, upon request, provide reasoned information to the submitting Party. In the event of a refusal to authorize an application or a delay exceeding four months from the date of the first application the Party of the submitting persons or undertakings may call for urgent consultations under Article 13 of this Agreement, which shall take place at the earliest opportunity and in any case not later than 30 days after such a request.
ARTICLE 5 - TRANSFER OF NUCLEAR MATERIAL, NON-NUCLEAR MATERIAL, EQUIPMENT, COMPONENTS AND RELATED TECHNOLOGY
1. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment and components may be transferred for applications consistent with this Agreement. Any special fissionable material transferred under this Agreement shall be low enriched uranium, except as provided in paragraph 5.
2. Sensitive nuclear technology, heavy water production technology, sensitive nuclear facilities, heavy water production facilities and major critical components of such facilities may be transferred under this Agreement pursuant to an amendment to this Agreement. Transfers of dual-use items that could be used in enrichment, reprocessing or heavy water production facilities will be subject to the Parties' respective applicable laws, regulations and license policies.
3. Natural or low enriched uranium may be transferred for use as fuel in reactor experiments and in reactors, for conversion or fabrication, or for such other purposes as may be agreed to by the Parties.
4. The quantity of nuclear material transferred under this Agreement shall be consistent with any of the following purposes: use in reactor experiments or the loading of reactors, the efficient and continuous conduct of such reactor experiments or operation of reactors for their lifetime, use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and the accomplishment of other purposes as may be agreed by the Parties.
5. Small quantities of special fissionable material may be transferred for use as samples, standards, detectors, and targets, and for such other purposes as the Parties may agree.
6.
(a) The United States has conveyed its commitment to the reliable supply of fuel to India. Consistent with the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement, the United States has also reaffirmed its assurance to create the necessary conditions for India to have assured and full access to fuel for its reactors. As part of its implementation of the July 18, 2005, Joint Statement the United States is committed to seeking agreement from the U.S. Congress to amend its domestic laws and to work with friends and allies to adjust the practices of the Nuclear Suppliers Group to create the necessary conditions for India to obtain full access to the international fuel market, including reliable, uninterrupted and continual access to fuel supplies from firms in several nations.
(b) To further guard against any disruption of fuel supplies, the United States is prepared to take the following additional steps:
i) The United States is willing to incorporate assurances regarding fuel supply in the bilateral U.S.-India agreement on peaceful uses of nuclear energy under Section 123 of the U.S. Atomic Energy Act, which would be submitted to the U.S. Congress.
ii) The United States will join India in seeking to negotiate with the IAEA an India-specific fuel supply agreement.
iii) The United States will support an Indian effort to develop a strategic reserve of nuclear fuel to guard against any disruption of supply over the lifetime of India's reactors.
iv) If despite these arrangements, a disruption of fuel supplies to India occurs, the United States and India would jointly convene a group of friendly supplier countries to include countries such as Russia, France and the United Kingdom to pursue such measures as would restore fuel supply to India.
(c) In light of the above understandings with the United States, an India-specific safeguards agreement will be negotiated between India and the IAEA providing for safeguards to guard against withdrawal of safeguarded nuclear material from civilian use at any time as well as providing for corrective measures that India may take to ensure uninterrupted operation of its civilian nuclear reactors in the event of disruption of foreign fuel supplies. Taking this into account, India will place its civilian nuclear facilities under India-specific safeguards in perpetuity and negotiate an appropriate safeguards agreement to this end with the IAEA.
ARTICLE 6 - NUCLEAR FUEL CYCLE ACTIVITIES
In keeping with their commitment to full civil nuclear cooperation, both Parties, as they do with other states with advanced nuclear technology, may carry out the following nuclear fuel cycle activities:
i) Within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party, enrichment up to twenty percent in the isotope 235 of uranium transferred pursuant to this Agreement, as well as of uranium used in or produced through the use of equipment so transferred, may be carried out.
ii) Irradiation within the territorial jurisdiction of either Party of plutonium, uranium-233, high enriched uranium and irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.
iii) With a view to implementing full civil nuclear cooperation as envisioned in the Joint Statement of the Parties of July 18, 2005, the Parties grant each other consent to reprocess or otherwise alter in form or content nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, or equipment so transferred. To bring these rights into effect, India will establish a new national reprocessing facility dedicated to reprocessing safeguarded nuclear material under IAEA safeguards and the Parties will agree on arrangements and procedures under which such reprocessing or other alteration in form or content will take place in this new facility. Consultations on arrangements and procedures will begin within six months of a request by either Party and will be concluded within one year. The Parties agree on the application of IAEA safeguards to all facilities concerned with the above activities. These arrangements and procedures shall include provisions with respect to physical protection standards set out in Article 8, storage standards set out in Article 7, and environmental protections set forth in Article 11 of this Agreement, and such other provisions as may be agreed by the Parties. Any special fissionable material that may be separated may only be utilized in national facilities under IAEA safeguards.
iv) Post-irradiation examination involving chemical dissolution or separation of irradiated nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement or irradiated nuclear material used in or produced through the use of non-nuclear material, nuclear material or equipment so transferred may be carried out.
ARTICLE 7 - STORAGE AND RETRANSFERS
1. Plutonium and uranium 233 (except as either may be contained in irradiated fuel elements), and high enriched uranium, transferred pursuant to this Agreement or used in or produced through the use of material or equipment so transferred, may be stored in facilities that are at all times subject, as a minimum, to the levels of physical protection that are set out in IAEA document INFCIRC 225/REV 4 as it may be revised and accepted by the Parties. Each Party shall record such facilities on a list, made available to the other Party. A Party's list shall be held confidential if that Party so requests. Either Party may make changes to its list by notifying the other Party in writing and receiving a written acknowledgement. Such acknowledgement shall be given no later than thirty days after the receipt of the notification and shall be limited to a statement that the notification has been received. If there are grounds to believe that the provisions of this sub-Article are not being fully complied with, immediate consultations may be called for. Following upon such consultations, each Party shall ensure by means of such consultations that necessary remedial measures are taken immediately. Such measures shall be sufficient to restore the levels of physical protection referred to above at the facility in question. However, if the Party on whose territory the nuclear material in question is stored determines that such measures are not feasible, it will shift the nuclear material to another appropriate, listed facility it identifies.
2. Nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, components, and information transferred pursuant to this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred shall not be transferred or re-transferred to unauthorized persons or, unless the Parties agree, beyond the recipient Party's territorial jurisdiction.
ARTICLE 8 - PHYSICAL PROTECTION
1. Adequate physical protection shall be maintained with respect to nuclear material and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material or equipment so transferred.
2. To fulfill the requirement in paragraph 1, each Party shall apply measures in accordance with (i) levels of physical protection at least equivalent to the recommendations published in IAEA document INFCIRC/225/Rev.4 entitled "The Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and Nuclear Facilities," and in any subsequent revisions of that document agreed to by the Parties, and (ii) the provisions of the 1980 Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material and any amendments to the Convention that enter into force for both Parties.
3. The Parties will keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of those agencies or authorities having responsibility for ensuring that levels of physical protection for nuclear material in their territory or under their jurisdiction or control are adequately met and having responsibility for coordinating response and recovery operations in the event of unauthorized use or handling of material subject to this Article. The Parties will also keep each other informed through diplomatic channels of the designated points of contact within their national authorities to cooperate on matters of out-of-country transportation and other matters of mutual concern.
4. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.
ARTICLE 9 - PEACEFUL USE
Nuclear material, equipment and components transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material and by-product materialused in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, equipment, and components so transferred shall not be used by the recipient Party for any nuclear explosive device, for research on or development of any nuclear explosive device or for any military purpose.
ARTICLE 10 - IAEA SAFEGUARDS
1. Safeguards will be maintained with respect to all nuclear materials and equipment transferred pursuant to this Agreement, and with respect to all special fissionable material used in or produced through the use of such nuclear materials and equipment, so long as the material or equipment remains under the jurisdiction or control of the cooperating Party.
2. Taking into account Article 5.6 of this Agreement, India agrees that nuclear material and equipment transferred to India by the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment or components so transferred shall be subject to safeguards in perpetuity in accordance with the India-specific Safeguards Agreement between India and the IAEA [identifying data] and an Additional Protocol, when in force.
3. Nuclear material and equipment transferred to the United States of America pursuant to this Agreement and any nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, equipment, or components so transferred shall be subject to the Agreement between the United States of America and the IAEA for the application of safeguards in the United States of America, done at Vienna November 18, 1977, which entered into force on December 9, 1980, and an Additional Protocol, when in force.
4. If the IAEA decides that the application of IAEA safeguards is no longer possible, the supplier and recipient should consult and agree on appropriate verification measures.
5. Each Party shall take such measures as are necessary to maintain and facilitate the application of IAEA safeguards in its respective territory provided for under this Article.
6. Each Party shall establish and maintain a system of accounting for and control of nuclear material transferred pursuant to this Agreement and nuclear material used in or produced through the use of any material, equipment, or components so transferred. The procedures applicable to India shall be those set forth in the India-specific Safeguards Agreement referred to in Paragraph 2 of this Article.
7. Upon the request of either Party, the other Party shall report or permit the IAEA to report to the requesting Party on the status of all inventories of material subject to this Agreement.
8. The provisions of this Article shall be implemented in such a manner as to avoid hampering, delay, or undue interference in the Parties' peaceful nuclear activities and so as to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe and economic conduct of their peaceful nuclear programs.
ARTICLE 11 - ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The Parties shall cooperate in following the best practices for minimizing the impact on the environment from any radioactive, chemical or thermal contamination arising from peaceful nuclear activities under this Agreement and in related matters of health and safety.
ARTICLE 12 - IMPLEMENTATION OF THE AGREEMENT
1. This Agreement shall be implemented in a manner designed:
a) to avoid hampering or delaying the nuclear activities in the territory of either Party;b) to avoid interference in such activities;c) to be consistent with prudent management practices required for the safe conduct of such activities; andd) to take full account of the long term requirements of the nuclear energy programs of the Parties.
2. The provisions of this Agreement shall not be used to:
a) secure unfair commercial or industrial advantages or to restrict trade to the disadvantage of persons and undertakings of either Party or hamper their commercial or industrial interests, whether international or domestic;b) interfere with the nuclear policy or programs for the promotion of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy including research and development; orc) impede the free movement of nuclear material, non nuclear material and equipment supplied under this Agreement within the territory of the Parties.
3. When execution of an agreement or contract pursuant to this Agreement between Indian and United States organizations requires exchanges of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territories and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices. When other cooperation pursuant to this Agreement requires visits of experts, the Parties shall facilitate entry of the experts to their territory and their stay therein consistent with national laws, regulations and practices.
ARTICLE 13 - CONSULTATIONS
1. The Parties undertake to consult at the request of either Party regarding the implementation of this Agreement and the development of further cooperation in the field of peaceful uses of nuclear energy on a stable, reliable and predictable basis. The Parties recognize that such consultations are between two States with advanced nuclear technology, which have agreed to assume the same responsibilities and practices and acquire the same benefits and advantages as other leading countries with advanced nuclear technology.
2. Each Party shall endeavor to avoid taking any action that adversely affects cooperation envisaged under Article 2 of this Agreement. If either Party at any time following the entry into force of this Agreement does not comply with the provisions of this Agreement, the Parties shall promptly hold consultations with a view to resolving the matter in a way that protects the legitimate interests of both Parties, it being understood that rights of either Party under Article 16.2 remain unaffected.
3. Consultations under this Article may be carried out by a Joint Committee specifically established for this purpose. A Joint Technical Working Group reporting to the Joint Committee will be set up to ensure the fulfillment of the requirements of the Administrative Arrangements referred to in Article 17.
ARTICLE 14 - TERMINATION AND CESSATION OF COOPERATION
1. Either Party shall have the right to terminate this Agreement prior to its expiration on one year's written notice to the other Party. A Party giving notice of termination shall provide the reasons for seeking such termination. The Agreement shall terminate one year from the date of the written notice, unless the notice has been withdrawn by the providing Party in writing prior to the date of termination.
2. Before this Agreement is terminated pursuant to paragraph 1 of this Article, the Parties shall consider the relevant circumstances and promptly hold consultations, as provided in Article 13, to address the reasons cited by the Party seeking termination. The Party seeking termination has the right to cease further cooperation under this Agreement if it determines that a mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues has not been possible or cannot be achieved through consultations. The Parties agree to consider carefully the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation of cooperation. They further agree to take into account whether the circumstances that may lead to termination or cessation resulted from a Party's serious concern about a changed security environment or as a response to similar actions by other States which could impact national security.
3. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of this Agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, the Parties shall consider whether the action was caused inadvertently or otherwise and whether the violation could be considered as material. No violation may be considered as being material unless corresponding to the definition of material violation or breach in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. If a Party seeking termination cites a violation of an IAEA safeguards agreement as the reason for notice for seeking termination, a crucial factor will be whether the IAEA Board of Governors has made a finding of non-compliance.4. Following the cessation of cooperation under this Agreement, either Party shall have the right to require the return by the other Party of any nuclear material, equipment, non-nuclear material or components transferred under this Agreement and any special fissionable material produced through their use. A notice by a Party that is invoking the right of return shall be delivered to the other Party on or before the date of termination of this Agreement. The notice shall contain a statement of the items subject to this Agreement as to which the Party is requesting return. Except as provided in provisions of Article 16.3, all other legal obligations pertaining to this Agreement shall cease to apply with respect to the nuclear items remaining on the territory of the Party concerned upon termination of this Agreement.
5. The two Parties recognize that exercising the right of return would have profound implications for their relations. If either Party seeks to exercise its right pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party of any nuclear items mentioned in paragraph 4, undertake consultations with the other Party. Such consultations shall give special consideration to the importance of uninterrupted operation of nuclear reactors of the Party concerned with respect to the availability of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes as a means of achieving energy security. Both Parties shall take into account the potential negative consequences of such termination on the on-going contracts and projects initiated under this Agreement of significance for the respective nuclear programmes of either Party.
6. If either Party exercises its right of return pursuant to paragraph 4 of this Article, it shall, prior to the removal from the territory or from the control of the other Party, compensate promptly that Party for the fair market value thereof and for the costs incurred as a consequence of such removal. If the return of nuclear items is required, the Parties shall agree on methods and arrangements for the return of the items, the relevant quantity of the items to be returned, and the amount of compensation that would have to be paid by the Party exercising the right to the other Party.
7. Prior to return of nuclear items, the Parties shall satisfy themselves that full safety, radiological and physical protection measures have been ensured in accordance with their existing national regulations and that the transfers pose no unreasonable risk to either Party, countries through which the nuclear items may transit and to the global environment and are in accordance with existing international regulations.
8. The Party seeking the return of nuclear items shall ensure that the timing, methods and arrangements for return of nuclear items are in accordance with paragraphs 5, 6 and 7. Accordingly, the consultations between the Parties shall address mutual commitments as contained in Article 5.6. It is not the purpose of the provisions of this Article regarding cessation of cooperation and right of return to derogate from the rights of the Parties under Article 5.6.
9. The arrangements and procedures concluded pursuant to Article 6(iii) shall be subject to suspension by either Party in exceptional circumstances, as defined by the Parties, after consultations have been held between the Parties aimed at reaching mutually acceptable resolution of outstanding issues, while taking into account the effects of such suspension on other aspects of cooperation under this Agreement.
ARTICLE 15 - SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Any dispute concerning the interpretation or implementation of the provisions of this Agreement shall be promptly negotiated by the Parties with a view to resolving that dispute.
ARTICLE 16 - ENTRY INTO FORCE AND DURATION
1. This Agreement shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that they have completed all applicable requirements for its entry into force.
2. This Agreement shall remain in force for a period of40 years. It shall continue in force thereafter for additional periods of 10 years each. Each Party may, by giving 6 months written notice to the other Party, terminate this Agreement at the end of the initial 40 year period or at the end of any subsequent 10 year period.
3. Notwithstanding the termination or expiration of this Agreement or withdrawal of a Party from this Agreement, Articles 5.6(c), 6, 7, 8, 9, 10 and 15 shall continue in effect so long as any nuclear material, non-nuclear material, by-product material, equipment or components subject to these articles remains in the territory of the Party concerned or under its jurisdiction or control anywhere, or until such time as the Parties agree that such nuclear material is no longer usable for any nuclear activity relevant from the point of view of safeguards.
4. This Agreement shall be implemented in good faith and in accordance with the principles of international law.
5. The Parties may consult, at the request of either Party, on possible amendments to this Agreement. This Agreement may be amended if the Parties so agree. Any amendment shall enter into force on the date on which the Parties exchange diplomatic notes informing each other that their respective internal legal procedures necessary for the entry into force have been completed.
ARTICLE 17 - ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENT
1. The appropriate authorities of the Parties shall establish an Administrative Arrangement in order to provide for the effective implementation of the provisions of this Agreement.
2. The principles of fungibility and equivalence shall apply to nuclear material and non-nuclear material subject to this Agreement. Detailed provisions for applying these principles shall be set forth in the Administrative Arrangement.
3. The Administrative Arrangement established pursuant to this Article may be amended by agreement of the appropriate authorities of the Parties.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Agreement.
DONE at , this day of , 200 , in duplicate.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THEUNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
FOR THE GOVERNMENTOF INDIA:
AGREED MINUTE
During the negotiation of the Agreement for Cooperation Between the Government of the United States of America and the Government of India Concerning Peaceful Uses of Nuclear Energy ("the Agreement") signed today, the following understandings, which shall be an integral part of the Agreement, were reached.
Proportionality
For the purposes of implementing the rights specified in Articles 6 and 7 of the Agreement with respect to special fissionable material and by-product material produced through the use of nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, transferred pursuant to the Agreement and not used in or produced through the use of equipment transferred pursuant to the Agreement, such rights shall in practice be applied to that proportion of special fissionable material and by-product material produced that represents the ratio of transferred nuclear material and non-nuclear material, respectively, used in the production of the special fissionable material and by-product material to the total amount of nuclear material and non-nuclear material so used, and similarly for subsequent generations.
By-product material
The Parties agree that reporting and exchanges of information on by-product material subject to the Agreement will be limited to the following:
(1) Both Parties would comply with the provisions as contained in the IAEA document GOV/1999/19/Rev.2, with regard to by-product material subject to the Agreement.
(2) With regard to tritium subject to the Agreement, the Parties will exchange annually information pertaining to its disposition for peaceful purposes consistent with Article 9 of this Agreement.
FOR THE GOVERNMENT OF THEUNITED STATES OF AMERICA:
FOR THE GOVERNMENTOF INDIA:
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